I am currently an Assistant Professor at the Univerisity of Tennessee in Knoxville. I recently completed a dissertation under the supervision of Carl Craver at Washington University in St. Louis, earning a PhD in Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology (PNP). My research revolves around trauma: What is trauma? Who determines what counts as a "traumatic experience" and what doesn't? Can entire groups be traumatized?
Abstract: This paper examines the significance of episodic memories in the development of psychological trauma. Many philosophical accounts of trauma assume that traumatic memories play a central role in post-traumatic symptomatology. I outline two such accounts—Bessel van der Kolk’s and Avishai Margalit’s—before presenting counterexamples showing that explicit, conscious retrieval of episodic memories is not necessary for trauma symptoms to develop. These cases include individuals with episodic memory deficits, unconscious traumatic experiences, or childhood amnesia. I argue that trauma can involve either (1) memories of the event or (2) imaginings or simulations that replicate the role of traumatic memories in paradigmatic cases (e.g., wartime violence). These conclusions align with simulationist models of memory. Clinically, this highlights the importance of addressing symptoms and beliefs rather than solely focusing on memory recall in treatment. Philosophically, it expands our understanding of trauma to include underrecognized forms, such as societal or group-level trauma.
Judith Carlisle
In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, edited by J. Robert Thompson.
Abstract: Are explicit mental states at a “higher level” than implicit mental states? Many philosophers and cognitive scientists have assumed that the explicit/implicit distinction implies that there are distinct levels of cognition – and that developing our understanding of levels could clarify the nature of the implicit/explicit distinction. Others have suggested that this assumption is unfounded – that explicit and implicit mental states are on the same level. What are the arguments used to support each side of this debate? Here I will taxonomize these arguments while attempting to clarify two questions as they arise within this debate. First, what is the sense of level in play? Is it levels of organization? Or levels of complexity, processing, or sophistication? Is it perhaps best explicated by reference to Marr’s division of the computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels? Second, what is the central contrast between the explicit and the implicit? Is it between the conscious and the unconscious? The intentional and the unintentional? The rational and the automatic? Answering these questions will hopefully clarify the nature of this debate and show where the true disagreement lies.
Isobel Ronai, Gregor P. Greslehner, Federico Boem, Judith Carlisle, Adrian Stencel, Javier Suárez, Saliha Bayir, Wiebke Bretting, Joana Formosinho, Anna C. Guerrero, William H. Morgan, Cybèle Prigot-Maurice, Salome Rodeck, Marie Vasse, Jacqueline M. Wallis & Oryan Zacks
In Microbiome 8 (1): 117. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40168-020-00898-7.
Abstract: How does microbiota research impact our understanding of biological individuality? We summarize the interdisciplinary summer school on “Microbiota, symbiosis and individuality: conceptual and philosophical issues” (July 2019), which was supported by a European Research Council starting grant project “Immunity, DEvelopment, and the Microbiota” (IDEM). The summer school centered around interdisciplinary group work on four facets of microbiota research: holobionts, individuality, causation, and human health. The conceptual discussion of cutting-edge empirical research provided new insights into microbiota and highlights the value of incorporating into meetings experts from other disciplines, such as philosophy and history of science.
Yoni K. Ashar; Alan Gordon; Howard Schubiner; Christie Uipi; Karen Knight; Zachary Anderson; Judith Carlisle; Laurie Polisky; Stephan Geuter; Thomas F. Flood; Philip A. Kragel; Sona Dimidjian; Mark A. Lumley; Tor D. Wager
In JAMA Psychiatry 79 (1): 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.2669.
Media related to the project:
Our research article published in JAMA Psychiatry
A write up in the Washington Post
A podcast about our research or a 16 min segment on Colorado Public Radio
A 2-min video on CBS Evening News or a 7-min, more in-depth video interview on Gaia News
Judith F. Carlisle, Grant K. Murphy, and Alison M. Roark.
In Symbiosis 71 (2):121–27. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13199-016-0456-1
Representative histological sections of sampled anemones:
a) Female symbiotic anemone with oocytes present; b) male symbiotic anemone with sperm follicles present; c) magnified inset of panel a; d) magnified inset of panel b; e) female aposymbiotic anemone with no oocytes present; f) male aposymbiotic anemone with no sperm follicles present. Anemones were sectioned at 7 μm and stained with hematoxylin and eosin. Scale bar = 1 mm. Abbreviations: CM = complete mesentery, DMs = directive mesenteries, IM = incomplete mesentery, MF = mesenterial filament, Os = oocytes, S = siphonoglyph, SFs = sperm follicles, TM = tertiary mesentery